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Abstract—Rapid advances in smart devices tremendously fa-
cilitate our day-to-day lives. However, these can be exploited
remotely via existing cyber vulnerabilities to cause disruption at
the physical infrastructure level. In this paper, we discover a novel
distributed and stealthy attack that uses malicious actuation of a
large number of small-scale loads residing within a distribution
network (DN). This attack is capable of cumulatively violating
the underlying operational system limits, leading to widespread
and prolonged disruptions. A key element of this attack is the
efficient use of attack resources, planned via Stackelberg games.
To mitigate this type of an attack, we propose a countermeasure
strategy which adaptively suppresses adverse effects of the attack
when detected in a timely manner. The effectiveness of the
proposed mitigation strategy is demonstrated via theoretical
convergence studies, practical evaluations and comparisons with
the state-of-the-art using realistic load flow and DN infrastructure
models.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the advent of the internet of things (IoT), alarge number of traditionally passive devices are now
equipped with communication capabilities and the ability to
make intelligent decisions. In the electricity sector, recent
advances in the metering infrastructure (e.g. smart meters)
and loads (e.g. smart appliances) are revolutionizing power
distribution, management and consumption. However, these
devices are also associated with well-documented vulnerabili-
ties that can be exploited by an adversary to inflict costly and
irreversible system-wide disruptions.
As such, a significant flaw in the Zigbee wireless communi-
cation protocol has been identified recently [1]. This protocol
is widely used to connect not only consumer-centric cyber-
enabled loads but also smart meters and data concentrators that
collect, process and transmit power consumption data to the
electric power utility (EPU) [2]. The potency of this flaw was
highlighted when a drone was used to apply an “over-the-air”
adversarial firmware update on smart light bulbs to remotely
actuate a set of strobing light patterns [3]. Standard security
mechanisms implemented in these smart bulbs were bypassed
via side-channel attacks. This work has been successful in
exhibiting how a vulnerability in the cyber-domain can be
exploited to instigate physically observable disruptions by
using readily available low-cost commercial equipment. This
case study has significant implications for the electric grid -
especially at the distribution network (DN) level.
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The DN is a low-voltage system that delivers power to con-
sumers. The proliferation of smart appliances in the residential
sector has introduced many points of vulnerability in the DN
as these utilize communication protocols such as Zigbee which
are associated with well-documented flaws. As smart loads are
typically connected to the Internet, an adversary will be able to
remotely compromise these in large numbers [4]. These threats
are not limited only to consumer-centric devices. Infrastruc-
ture management devices such as the smart meters and data
concentrators also communicate via these protocols [2]. The
effect of actuating a large number of small-scale appliances
specifically targeting physical system limits can be devastating
as protection devices (e.g. fuses, circuit breakers, etc.) can be
triggered and result in widespread service outages [5]. Due to
the cumulative nature of the attack, the EPU will have great
difficulty isolating misbehaving devices individually. Hence,
securing the DN from cyber-attacks using only cryptographic
techniques no longer suffices. Active defence mechanisms
consisting of power injecting elements that adapt to current
conditions of the system are necessary to mitigate the physical
effects of such cyber-physical attacks.
In this paper, we show how an adversary may exploit
cyber vulnerabilities of power devices to mount a new type
of stealthy distributed attack on a power grid at the DN
level by targeting system limits. We also propose a defence
mechanism to effectively mitigate the adverse effects of such
an attack. The attack scheme involves strategically actuating
a large number smart appliances that have been compromised
in order to overwhelm the physical limits. The effective use
of attack resources is planned by applying Stackelberg games.
The proposed defence mechanism counteracts this by deploy-
ing active power injection resources such as storage devices
and/or distributed generation located within the DN. Existing
literature pertaining to securing DN can be categorized into
three general classes: resilience against communication chan-
nel attacks; mitigation of the effects of data tampering; and
maintaining system limits. In the first class, emphasis has been
placed on detecting cyber intrusion and securing smart grid
communication protocols from attacks such as jamming and
denial-of-service (DoS) [6]–[8]. In the second category, meth-
ods by which the state information generated in the DN can be
tampered via false data injection attacks have been explored
and recent advances allow these attacks to be detected in real-
time [9], [10]. In the final class of proposals, resilience has
been incorporated into the core of algorithms that coordinate
power injecting and consuming elements residing within the
DN to maintain system limits [11], [12]. Attack construction
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techniques compromising consumer loads and IoT devices are
presented in references [4], [13]. However, to the best of the
authors’ knowledge, no attack strategies have been proposed
in the literature for actuating a large number of small-scale
compromised sources in a stealthy manner to cause targeted
system-wide disruptions in the DN.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are four-fold: 1)
We identify how Stackelberg games can be utilized by the
attacker to target specific DN buses for maximum disruption
by evaluating the capabilities of existing defence mechanisms
deployed by the EPU; 2) We show how an adversary may
use population games to stealthily coordinate a large number
of compromised smart loads via periodic broadcasts of cost
signals and iterative revisions of individual load actuation; 3)
We propose real-time and adaptive defence mechanisms based
on data aggregation to mitigate the adverse effects of adversar-
ial attacks; and 4) The effectiveness of the proposed attack-
mitigation scheme is demonstrated via practical simulations
conducted on IEEE 33-bus, IEEE 69-bus and Brazilian 136-
bus DN systems along with theoretical convergence results
and comparisons to state-of-the-art coordination strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec.II
introduces the system model utilized in this paper for the
construction of the attack-mitigation scheme. Sec. III and IV
present the attack and mitigation schemes proposed in this
paper. Sec. V presents the results of applying these strategies
to practical systems and the paper is concluded in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the attack-mitigation model, notations and
steady-state DN system operational limits are presented.
A. Attack-Mitigation Model
The DN considered in this paper is composed of power
injecting components managed by the EPU and a large number
of active loads equipped with communication capabilities
(e.g. smart appliances) that are susceptible to cyber-attacks.
As such, following are the assumptions made in our attack-
mitigation model (also adopted in references [10], [11]):
1) Attacker will be able to observe power injec-
tions/absorptions across the DN;
2) Attacker can compromise smart loads via the communi-
cation channel;
3) Attacker can securely communicate with all compro-
mised devices;
4) Attacker has no information about the operating state of
EPU resources after the attack has commenced;
5) EPU will be able to detect the onset of the attack;
6) EPU will detect corrupt state measurements; and
7) EPU can securely communicate with all of its resources.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are valid as it is possible to exploit ex-
isting vulnerabilities in software systems and communication
protocols to gain access to cyber-enabled devices such as data
concentrators and smart appliances [14]. Moreover, as smart
loads are typically connected to the commonly accessible
Internet, it will be possible for the adversary to breach into
these devices from a remote location [15]. Assumption 3
Figure 1: Active DN (Pillai et al [16]) consisting of defence
(green) and attacked (red) resources.
is feasible as the attackers will have complete control over
the attacked loads via the cyber channels. Assumption 4 is
realistic as once the onset of an attack has been identified,
the EPU will either switch to a higher level of security for
system monitoring regardless of the latencies and overheads
incurred or completely isolate monitoring equipments from
the public domain [2]. Assumption 5 is supported by the
widespread integration of the advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) in the DN that produces comprehensive real-time power
consumption measurements [2]. Excessive stress and conges-
tions on the DN will be evident from these measurements.
Assumption 6 stems from recent advances in the detection of
false data injections into state measurements [10]. The final
assumption is practical as the EPU will utilize secure channels
to communicate with its ancillary devices [14]. Furthermore,
Assumptions 4-7 indicate a best case scenario and violating
these will only make it easier for the attack to succeed.
B. Notations
The primary function of the DN is to deliver power trans-
ported by the transmission network (from large-scale syn-
chronous plants) to end-user appliances. The DN is composed
of n buses B = {b1 . . . bn} and l lines L = {i ↔ j}
connecting buses bi, bj ∈ B where bi is closer to the feeder
bus than bj . Each bus bi consists of active cyber-physical
elements (e.g. storage, smart appliances, electric vehicles and
distributed generation) that are directly controlled by the
consumers (E iC), EPU (E iEPU ) or the adversary (E iA). In Fig.
1, an illustration of a low-voltage Danish DN is presented
[16]. It is possible for a bus to consist of either, both or none
of these components. The adversary will employ resources
in EA = {E1A, . . . , EnA} to violate steady-state limits of DN
lines and buses by maximizing the deviations of system states
from nominal operating values and the EPU will coordinate
elements in EEPU = {E1EPU , . . . , EnEPU} to minimize these
deviations. Thus, the attacker utilizes evasion to maximize
system disruption while the EPU behaves like a pursuer to
mitigate the ensuing adverse effects.
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C. Steady-state System Limits
Steady-state limits in the active DN are typically associated
with 1) power flow in DN lines and 2) bus voltages. The
maximum apparent power flow limit imposed on each DN
line i ↔ j is s̄i,j and this depends on the physical attributes
of the line such as reactance and conductance. As the DN is a
low-voltage system and the DN lines are associated with low
reactance to resistance ratio, excessive power flow in the lines
caused by significant power consumption by loads will not
only violate power flow limits but also lead to steep voltage
drops in buses that can result in under-voltage conditions.
Thus, voltage Vi on bus bi is subject to upper and lower
limits (i.e. V i ≤ |Vi| ≤ V̄i). Typically, for safe operation, bus
voltages in the DN are required to operate within the ±5%
interval of the nominal voltages. In the per unit (p.u.) scale,
this translates to V i = 0.95 and V̄i = 1.05 where the nominal
voltage is Vi = 1.0. If any of the afore-mentioned limits are
violated, disruptive and costly damages will be incurred by
DN equipment and loads.
III. DESIGN OF STEALTHY ATTACKS ON DN
The goal of the attacker is to efficiently coordinate compro-
mised active elements belonging to the set EA to maximize
the attack impact on the DN. The incremental nature of the
attack will render isolation of compromised nodes difficult
for the EPU. The attack is therefore stealthy. To achieve this,
the attacker will first assimilate how its limited resources can
be utilized effectively to maximize the adverse effects on
the system via solution concepts in Stackelberg games (as
outlined in Sec. III-A). Through this process, the adversary
will identify specific DN buses to target in the attack. After
breaching into active cyber-enabled loads residing within these
buses via the communication channel, the attacker will design
distributed actuation strategies that will be executed by these
compromised loads for stealthily saturating DN line limits
over-time. The attacker will strive to breach into a large
number of small-scale power consuming elements such as
smart appliances and electric vehicles residing within the
target buses and leverage on the notion of anonymization in
population game theory (PGT) as detailed in Sec. III-B to
prevent premature isolation of the attack.
A. Attack Planning via Stackelberg Games
The adversary will aim to maximize the disruption in the
DN by strategically deploying its resources. First, the state
measurement signals generated in the DN will be observed
by the attacker over a period of time to glean insights into
the characteristics (e.g. availability) of defence mechanisms
deployed by the EPU (based on Assumption 1). This infor-
mation will then be leveraged to systematically target specific
buses that have the greatest potential to succumb to adversarial
stress. For this, theoretical constructs from Stackelberg games
are applied. Although Stackelberg games have been used in
the literature in the context of energy management [17] and
vulnerability analysis [18], this is the first time these are being
effectively utilized for attack planning.
Stackelberg games model natural competition in a system
consisting of a dominant leader and a follower [19]. In this
class of games, the leader will always make the first move.
The follower will observe the action taken by the leader and
then react using best-response strategy whereby it will aim to
minimize its losses with respect to the leader’s decision. This
leader-follower paradigm fits well into the target identification
process in the active DN as the EPU is analogous to the leader
and the adversary is akin to the follower. The EPU is primarily
involved in the design of the active DN and it will deploy
active defence and protection mechanisms that are naturally
subject to limitations (e.g. economical, capacity constraints,
etc.). The adversary silently observes the behaviour of the sys-
tem via state measurement signals and deduces the attributes
of the defence mechanisms deployed by the EPU. These
insights are then used to target specific buses in the active
DN for maximal disruption. Opposite roles will be studied in
future work involving planning studies where the EPU will
deploy defence mechanisms based on empirically observed
behaviour of adversaries. As such, the optimization problem
PT is formulated as a typical follower problem listed in the
work of Yin et al [19] for which parameters are computed














Optimization variables a = {a1 . . . an} represent the prob-
abilities of attacking buses B. ci is probability of the EPU
activating its resources in bi ∈ B. U ca(bi) is the utility for
the attacker if the target bus bi is covered (i.e. defended) by
the EPU. Uua (bi) is the utility for the attacker if the target
bus is uncovered (i.e. not defended) by the EPU. fi(ai) is
the cost incurred by the attacker for deploying its resources
for attacking bi. As the utility for the attacker if the target is
covered is lower than otherwise, Uua (bi) − U ca(bi) > 0. We
design these utility functions as follows:
Uca(bi) = (min
[
plimi,j − p̃i,j , p̌i, EiA
]
− d̃i) ∗ (p̃i,j − p̃i) (1)
Uua (bi) = (min
[
plimi,j − p̃i,j , p̌i, EiA)− di
]





plimi,j is the upper limit of real power flow on line i↔ j, p̃i,j
is the average power flow on the line, p̌i is the adversarial
real power injection at bus i that will force the local bus
voltage magnitude |Vi| to drop to the minimum allowable
bus voltage Vi when no other actuation takes place in the
DN, E iA is the available real power injection capacity for the
attacker at bi, d̃i is the average power injection capacity of
EPU defence resources at bi while di is the average minimum
power injection capacity of the EPU and p̃i is the average
power injection of bi. As the adversary intends to instigate
widespread outage in the system, the utilities are designed
to account for the minimum adversarial power injection that
will either saturate the local line i ↔ j, or cause a local
bus voltage drop that reduces the voltage limit margin to
0, or completely exhaust locally available adversarial power
injection capability. This is captured by the minimum term in
both U ca and U
u
a . As d̃i > di, the relation U
u
a (bi)−U ca(bi) > 0
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holds. The probability ci of the EPU covering bi is defined
to be the proportion of time EPU capacity is greater than
the average capacity of these resources. The adversary can
utilize local measurements to compute p̃i,j , d̃i and P idi≥d̃i . The
computation of p̌i is more involved and this will be discussed
next. We show that p̌i can be computed just based on the
impedances of lines in Pi which is composed of all the lines
that form a path from bi to the feeder node b0 as follows:




where |Vi|2 is the magnitude of voltage at bi prior to the
instigation of local attack and rg,l is the resistance of line
g ↔ l. To derive this relation, we first note that due to power
balance requirements, the voltage drop from the feeder b0











where xg,l is the reactance of the line g ↔ l and Ĩg,l is the
average current flow on the line prior to adversarial actua-
tion. The second term in the summation which is quadratic
represents power losses and this is typically eliminated as the
power flow on the line is much larger than these losses. This
holds in our system model as the attacker strives to saturate
power links. The adversarial power draw p̌i will increase the
real power flow from p̃g,l to p̃g,l + p̌. The ensuing change in
bus voltage can be computed by subtracting Eq. 5 prior to the
adversarial draw with Eq. 5 attained after the adversarial draw
to obtain Eq. 4. p̌i can be computed with no knowledge of
power flow or bus voltages in other parts of the DN.
Closed-form solution exists for PT if the cost function
fi(ai) is convex and twice continuously differentiable. This is
typically the case as greater the probability of attack, the more
resources will be required for the attack and thus greater will
be the cost incurred by the attacker and this can be modelled
as a convex function. Furthermore, ai ∈ [0, 1] is a continuous
interval. To derive the solution ai, the first-order condition
for optimality is applied where the gradient of the objective








a(bi) + (1− ci)Uua (bi)
)
)]10 (6)
where the notation [.]10 implies that the minimum and maxi-
mum values ai can take are 0 and 1. This value is normalized
to obtain anomi = ai/ max
i∈1...n
(ai). The attack probability vector
a = {anom1 . . . anomn } is then used by the adversary to decide
on which buses will be targeted for compromise. This way,
the attacker will not need to use an exorbitant amount of
resources to attack all DN buses but rather focus on the
weaknesses in the EPU’s defence mechanism to perpetrate a
deeply resonating attack.
B. Attack Actuation via Population Games
After identifying the target buses, the adversary will proceed
to compromising as many cyber-enabled loads possible (based
on Assumption 2) located within each one of these buses in or-
der to obtain direct actuation access. While an unsophisticated
attacker may force all of these devices to draw the maximum
amount of power possible, ensuing sudden surges in power
flow will trip passive protection devices such as fuses/circuit
breakers. This will isolate the problematic components from
the rest of the DN [5], and thus minimize the effect on the
overall system. However, we will show that a smart attacker
will be able to deploy their attack that progresses without any
impulsive surges and avoid immediate isolation.
Theoretical constructs from population game theory (PGT)
are employed to design stealthy actuation of compromised
devices within each target bus. PGT models interactions be-
tween a large number of anonymous agents equipped with
identical discrete strategy set y = {y1 . . . ym}. The key feature
of the PGT framework is that the impact of individual actions
executed by the agents is incremental. The general state of the
system is inferred via aggregate measures x = {x1 . . . xm}.
xi represents the fraction of agents in the population using
strategy yi ∈ y. Each agent will switch its strategy from yi to
yj as dictated by the switching probability ρi,j(F (x)) and this
is a function of the cost F of the current state x of the system.
If F satisfies specific conditions (discussed later), then the
convergence of these random cost-based revisions to a unique
and optimal solution x∗ where F (x∗) = 0 is guaranteed.
The PGT paradigm supports many requirements entailed in
the construction of stealthy attacks in the DN. As the adversary
aims to utilize a large number of small-scale appliances to exe-
cute the attack in the target bus bi, the compromised appliances
are analogous to agents in PGT and form the population Pi
where |Pi| = qi. PGT allows for incremental and anonymous
changes in power consumption of these loads and this will
render the detection and isolation of the compromised devices
difficult. One specific deviation of the DN attack setup from
PGT is due to the different power consumption ratings and
settings associated with each appliance. Thus, all appliances
will not be equipped with the same strategy set. In order
to overcome this issue, if an appliance does not support a
particular level of power consumption ya ∈ y, it will select a
feasible setting that is the closest to ya and this is not cause
for concern as the impact of a single appliance in the grand





= 0 where δja is the
deviation of agent j from strategy ya).
In the DN attack setup, each bus bi will be coordinated
by the adversary independently from one another. Hence,
large number of compromised loads at each bus will form
separate populations. This will allow the attacker to focus on
weaknesses present at specific buses while also eliminating in-
terdependencies. Thus, all notations introduced from this point
on for the attack construction will be variables and parameters
maintained separately at each bus and index i representing bus
bi will not be included unless necessary. The system state x at
target bus bi is a vector representing the proportion of agents in
Pi utilizing specific strategies in y and belongs to the simplex
4 = {x|
∑
j=1...|y| xj = 1, xj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1 . . . |y|}. PiA is
solved by the attacker to compute actuation in bus bi.
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plimi,j − p̃i,j , p̌i, EiA)
]
It is evident from this formulation that the attacker aims
to minimize the usage of strategies with higher magnitudes
in order to prevent detection by the EPU via the quadratic
objective. The coupling constraint dictates the overall power
consumption in the target bus bi to either saturate the local
line, result in a voltage drop close to acceptable limits or
exhaust available adversarial resources. This will result in DN
congestions that can lead to widespread outages as shown in
Sec. V. Although solving PiA to obtain the optimal solution
x∗ is straightforward, it is difficult to assign specific actuation
strategies to individual compromised agents in a central man-
ner to achieve this aggregate state as each appliance will be
subject to different local constraints and settings. Hence, the
cost F (x) = {F1(x) . . . F|y|(x)} is used as a general broadcast
signal by the attacker to coordinate the compromised loads in
a distributed manner (Assumption 3). In particular, F is:
Fk(xk) = qixkyk + ν
∗qiyk ∀ k ∈ {1 . . . |y|} (7)
where ν∗ is the optimal Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the coupling constraint in PiA. F is in fact the gradient of the

















The optimal Lagrangian dual variable ν∗ results from solving
maxν LiA(x∗, ν) where x∗ is obtained by solving PiA. F (x)
is broadcast to all agents residing within bus bi periodically
every τ seconds. These signals are used by the adversary’s
agents for local strategy revisions. The simplex condition
on x is intrinsically satisfied due to the distributed strategy
selection by compromised loads. When the coupling constraint
is feasible, these distributed revisions will converge to the
optimal solution x∗ as (x∗ − x)TF (x∗) < 0 ∀ x ∈ 4 holds
[21], [22]. x∗ is the global solution as PiA is strictly convex.
F (x) is utilized by individual agents to revise local actua-
tion strategies at random time instances based on the switching








These revisions will result in the state dynamic: ẋi =∑
j∈y xjρj,i(F (x)) − xi
∑
j∈y ρi,j(F (x)) composed of the
rate at which agents switch into strategy yi and the rate at
which agents switch out of strategy yi. Stochastic effects are
averaged out due to the strong law of large numbers. As such,





yj∈y Fj(x) − Fi(x). This is in fact negative of the
projection of the cost function F (x) onto the simplex 4. As
F (x) is the gradient of LiA(x, ν∗), this implies that the system
will gravitate towards lower potential at each revision. More-
over, according to the Lyapunov theory, this dynamic results
in exponentially fast convergence to the optimal solution x∗
as the Lyapunov function is in fact LiA(x, ν∗) [22].
At optimality, the attacker would have successfully saturated
all links connected to bus bi and this will lead to excessive
voltage drops and equipment failure. These revisions will be
carried out in each one of the DN buses selected as targets by
the adversary which will result in the widespread reduction of
the DN system topology as illustrated in Sec. V. Algorithm
1 presents a summary of our proposal for stealthy attack
construction in the DN.
Algorithm 1 Attack Construction
1) Target Identification
for bi ∈ B do . Compute average parameters
Uca(bi)← (min
[
plimi,j − p̃i,j , p̌i, EiA)
]
− d̃i) ∗ (plimj,i − p̄j,i)
Uua (bi)← (min
[
plimi,j − p̃i,j , p̌i, EiA)
]
− di) ∗ (plimj,i − p̄j,i)
ci ← P idi≥d̄i
end for
a←Solve PT , anom ← a/ max
i∈1...n
a
for ai ∈ a do . Identify target buses for attack




2) Compromised Load Actuation Construction at bi ∈ A
Central Aggregation:
for every τ seconds do
Fj(xj)← qixjyj + ν∗qiyj ∀ j ∈ {1 . . . |y|}
Broadcast F (x) to all adversary agents in bi
end for
Individual Agents:
Initialize strategies to y1, trev ← rand(T )
if t > trev and rand(1) < ρi,j(F (x)) then
Switch to feasible strategy closest to yj
trev ← trev + rand(T )
end if
IV. EPU COUNTERMEASURE VIA DUAL UPDATES
Upon detecting anomalous power consumption in the DN
from aggregate measurements (Assumption 5), the EPU will
react by employing all available resources in EEPU to min-
imize system state deviations from nominal values. Defence
mechanisms such as storage devices and distributed generation
are becoming financially viable due to incentive mechanisms
from governments and advances in technologies [5]. The EPU
will utilize every power injecting element E iEPU located within
each bus bi ∈ B to offset abnormal power consumption across
the entire DN as it is not possible to single out compromised
devices effectively due to the stealthy nature of the proposed
attack strategy. An iterative approach based on monotone
operators will be employed by the EPU for the systematic and
cost-effective actuation of these devices. PGT is not applicable
here as the EPU resources are limited and are highly varying.
A. Countermeasure Formulation
The EPU will attempt to restore balance in net power
demands of the DN by optimally activating all of its secure
power injecting components using current state measurement
signals (Assumptions 6 and 7). As it is possible for the
adversary to cumulatively draw large amounts of power that
is much greater than the power injecting capacity locally
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available within that bus, the EPU will leverage on the surplus
capacity of resources located in other buses to offset this
imbalance. Thus, the EPU countermeasure problem PEPU

















≤ pig ≤ p̄ig ∀ bi ∈ B
pig is the power injected by the EPU resource E iEPU located
in bi and pia is the overall adversarial power draw in bi
(EPU can detect this due to Assumptions 5 and 6 and past
trends in power demands). Ci(pig) is the cost of dispatching
these resources and is set to be (pig)
2/(1 − |Vi|2) which is
strictly convex. This cost allows for greater power injection
in buses that are attacked (i.e. bus voltage magnitudes are
closer to lower limits). The coupling constraint dictates that
the overall power injected by the EPU must match the overall
adversarial power consumption in the system. The inequalities
impose upper p̄ig and lower p
i
g
bounds associated with the
generation capacity of E iEPU . The EPU will not be directly
solving PEPU as it will not be aware of local conditions that
affect the cost functions and generation limits of each bus.
This process is distributed whereby every EPU resource will
respond to general signals broadcast by the EPU based on
local constraints and costs.
B. Distributed EPU Coordination Strategy
EPU signals and resource actuation are computed using the
Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions which are necessary
and sufficient for optimality in convex optimization problems
[21]. The first condition is based on primal feasibility which
indicates that the optimal solution pig
∗ must satisfy the con-
straints listed in the primal problem PEPU . The second con-
dition is based on dual feasibility λi1
∗ ≥ 0, λi2
∗ ≥ 0 and ν∗ ∈
R ∀ bi ∈ B which is associated with the dual problem of
PEPU . The optimal dual variables λ∗1 and λ∗2 are associated
with the inequality constraints pertaining to the generation
capacities and ν∗ is associated with the coupling constraints of
PEPU . The third condition is derived from the complementary







) = 0 and λi2
∗
(pig
∗ − p̄ig) = 0 ∀ bi ∈ B.
These indicate that if the optimal solution does not activate
the inequality constraints (i.e. there is some slack in the





= 0 or pig
∗ − p̄ig = 0, these dual variables
will not necessarily be 0. The final condition is based on











is attained from the first-order optimality condition which
dictates that the gradient of the Lagrangian dual function with




These KKT conditions are used to eliminate λi variables
and derive the following dependencies between ν and pig .














If ν∗ ≤ −C′i(p̄ig) then pig
∗
= p̄ig (12)










The overall power injection in the system is a summation of
individual actuation of all devices in EEPU and this must be





The difference between the overall EPU power injection and














As d(ν) is a monotonically non-decreasing function with
respect to −ν, the solution ν∗ where d(ν∗) = 0 is a unique
solution [21]. The EPU will identify ν∗ via binary search.
For this, an initial guess of ν is periodically broadcast to all
EEPU every τ seconds. This signal is used for local actuation
by the EPU resources. This is repeated until d(ν) ∈ ±ε as
detailed in Algorithm 2. The interval [νmin, νmax] for ν is
Algorithm 2 Attack Construction
1) Signal Computation by EPU:






for every τ seconds when |d(ν)| > ε do
Broadcast ν
if d(ν) > 0 then
νmin ← (νmax + νmin)/2,
else
νmax ← (νmax + νmin)/2
end if
ν ← (νmax + νmin)/2
end for
2) Distributed Actuation by EPU Resources:







initialized using the power injection capacity ratings of EEPU
which are available to the EPU in advance and worst possible
costs incurred in bus bi based on current DN conditions. The
convergence rate of this algorithm is O(log(νmax−νminε )).
V. RESULTS
In this section, we verify the performance of the proposed
attack and mitigation strategies via simulations conducted
using realistic DNs such as IEEE 33-bus, IEEE 69-bus and
Brazilian 136-bus systems. We explore the impact on bus
voltages, power losses, and DN loads when the proposed
attack-mitigation strategies are applied. These present inter-
esting insights on how cyber attacks perpetrated on consumer
appliances can induce deeply resonating system failures and
how these adverse consequences can be averted with active
self-healing defence mechanisms. Then, we present a compar-
ative study.
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4 Cumulative Real Power Draw 
















(a) State evolution in 33-bus DN.






























(b) Minimum bus voltage post-attack.






























(c) Minimum bus voltage post-recovery.
Figure 2: Impact of application of attack and countermeasures.
















(a) Branch power losses.











































Comparison between PGT and SG Methods
PG
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(c) Comparison of PGT vs SG
Figure 3: Impact of EPU Resources and Comparative Study.
A. Evolution of System States with DN Attack-Mitigation
In Fig. 2a, we present the evolution of system states when
an adversary compromises buses in a 33-bus DN based on the
computed attack probabilities and coordinates the correspond-
ing consumer loads via the proposed population game theoretic
method. The attack takes place over one second and thereafter
the EPU dispatches its resources to protect the system. In
the first sub-plot, the cumulative real power consumed by
compromised loads evolves exponentially fast as expected for
the state dynamic induced by the projected strategy revision
technique. The impact of this abnormal distributed power draw
on bus voltage magnitude is illustrated in the second subplot.
The bus voltage magnitudes of all buses in the system are
plotted here. It is clear that the onset of the attack has resulted
in the dip of bus voltage magnitudes perilously close to the
lower limits. If the attack had not been intercepted by the
EPU, this continued trend will have resulted in the violation
of bus voltage limits and the onset of outages as illustrated
in the next section. At the 1 second mark, the EPU deploys
all available defence mechanisms to avert threshold violations
via the proposed countermeasure involving dual updates. It is
clear that the EPU is able to rapidly compensate adversarial
power draw and increase the safety margins of bus voltage
magnitudes.
B. Minimum Bus Voltage Magnitude
Next, we analyze the impact of adversarial resources on
minimum bus voltage magnitudes in 33-bus, 69-bus and 136-
bus DNs. First, we examine the case where only the attack
takes place in Fig. 2b, then in Fig. 2c, we analyze the
impact on the system in the post recovery period when EPU’s
defence mechanisms are deployed. The x-axis represents the
proportion rA of the adversarial resources with respect to the
EPU resources. As expected post-attack, when the adversarial
capacity increases, the impact on the bus voltage magnitudes is
pronounced and exhibits a downwards trend in Fig. 2b. The 33-
bus system is most affected due to the unbalanced topology of
the DN buses [26]. When the EPU resources are deployed, in
post-recovery it is clear that the voltage profile has improved
significantly. However, when the adversarial resources have
more than half the capacity of the EPU, the minimum bus
voltage magnitudes in 33-bus, 69-bus and 136-bus systems
reflect a downward trend. This is expected as the limited
capacity of the EPU will not be able to compensate for the
significant power draw enacted by the adversary across the
DN system. Thus, it is imperative to deploy adequate defence
mechanisms to offset adversarial attacks like these.
C. Branch Power Losses
Excessive adversarial power draw can result in power losses
in the DN lines. In Fig. 3a, the average power loss reduction
ratio (post recovery versus post attack) LR in DN lines
achieved post recovery for various values of rA is examined.
When the adversarial resources are scarce (i.e. rA is close
to 0), the power loss improvement resulting from the EPU
resources allows for better performance than the original
state of the DN (i.e. when LR > 1). This is due to EPU
resources having greater capacity than compromised loads at
various buses. Hence, greater reduction of power losses in
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lines/branches can be attributed to reverse power flow. Thus,
active defence mechanisms not only avert adversarial attacks
but can also be utilized for improving the voltage profile of
the DN.
D. Load Recovery
The main goal of the adversarial attack is to trigger
protection mechanisms that will result in widespread power
outages in the DN. When system limits (e.g. bus voltage
magnitudes and apparent power flow limits) are violated,
outages will ensue. In Fig. 3b, the proportion of loads that have
been recovered post deployment of EPU resources is studied.
When adversarial resources are lower than EPU resources,
load recovery is 100% (i.e. rA is low). However, when the
adversarial resources exceed the EPU resources, some loads
are severed in the 33-bus system while this is not observed in
the 69-bus and 136-bus systems. This can be attributed to the
deeply linear arrangement of buses in the 33-bus system. When
the adversary is successful imposing undue stress on specific
buses, then all descendent buses will be isolated or affected.
This will result in the severing of a large number of loads from
the network. This is not the case with the 69-bus and 136-bus
system which has more balanced tree topologies. Thus, this
key insight also highlights the importance of designing a DN
with a balanced network structure.
E. Comparison
Both the attack and mitigation strategies involve the coordi-
nation of either adversarial or defence resources. With defence
resources, convergence is highly rapid as illustrated in Fig. 2a.
However, adversarial coordination involves a large number of
consumer-centric loads with incremental impact on the system
and this is not the case with the EPU resources. Thus, the
performance of the coordination mechanism with respect to
the number of active elements is an important consideration.
For an adversary to stealthily exact an attack, the cumulative
power draw should not result in irregular oscillations which
will not only trip protection devices such as a circuit breakers
but also alert the EPU to abnormal activities in the system.
There exist a large range of coordination algorithms in the
literature such as consensus algorithms [23], [24] based on
decentralized mechanisms which are associated with linear
convergence rates that are not tractable in large systems.
Other algorithms such as that based on sub-gradient (SG) [25]
method is utilized to compute coordinating signals which are
then utilized by individual agents to refine local strategies.
We show in Fig. 3c that the SG method results in significant
ringing in comparison to the proposed PG strategy. These
oscillations can prematurely trigger protection devices and this
is not the goal of the adversary. The proposed PG strategy
allows for the rapid coordination of a large number of loads
with no oscillations or other disruptive artifacts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Existing vulnerabilities in the cyber-domain can be lever-
aged by an adversary to perpetrate sophisticated attacks on the
DN system. An adversary can effectively coordinate a large
number of small-scale consumer-centric devices in a stealthy
and seamless manner. We have also shown that if the onset
of an attack can be detected in a timely manner, the EPU
can deploy its resources in a distributed manner to offset the
adverse effects of the attack on the system. As future work,
we intend to study how the EPU can detect stealthy cyber-
physical attacks in a timely manner. Moreover, we will also
study how the DN can be designed to be robust to stealthy
attacks and also how defence mechanisms can be planned to
maximally avert failures while incurring minimal cost.
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